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Abstract. Th is paper adopts a comparative approach in order to appreciate the distinct 
contributions of Arne Næss and Félix Guattari to ecosophy and their respective 
connections to semiotics. Th e foundational holistic worldview and dynamics ecosophy 
propounds show numerous connections with semiotics. Th e primary objective of 
this paper is to question the nature and value of these connections. Historically, the 
development of ecosophy was always faced with modelling and communication issues, 
which constitute an obvious common ground shared with semiotics. As a means to an 
end, ecosophy settled to develop a thoughtful axiology based on ecological wisdom 
and promote it bottom-up. Political activism notwithstanding, semiotics also deals with 
value: sign value and meaning. In this respect, semiotics is inherently axiological, but 
most oft en this dimension is eff aced or muted. Emphasizing the axiological dimension 
of semiotics helps understand how dominant signifi cations, habits, and values are 
established, and enlighten the crucial part it could play in the humanities and beyond 
by partly coalescing with ecosophy. As the complementarity of both traditions is 
appreciated, the plausibility of a merger is assessed. Arguably, ecosophy is axiomatized 
semiotics. From this novel perspective, one can see human communities as dynamically 
partaking in signifying processes, in a space that is at once an ecosphere, a semiosphere, 
and a vast political territory. As there is growing evidence that environmental 
degradation lessens our quality of life and the sustainability of our communities, 
ecosophy might help reform values and practices.
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Two versions of ecosophy: A comparative approach
Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss is the founding father of ‘ecosophy’, or Deep 
Ecology. He fi rst shared his thoughts on the subject at the 3rd World Future Research 
Conference in Bucharest, early September 1972. Shortly aft er, in 1973, his pioneering 
paper Th e Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary was 
published in Oslo (reprint: Næss 2008). Th e year 1974 saw the fi rst edition of Økologi, 
samfunn og livsstil: utkast til en økosofi , the Norwegian palimpsest of what was to 
become Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle (1989), his major contribution on ecosophy 
that helped raise environmental awareness worldwide. Næss also published a number 
of articles on the matter in infl uential journals in between (Næss 1984, 1986, 1988). 
Ecosophy is a paradigm for ecological reasoning anchored in a genuine philo-
sophical framework directed toward practical action, both through political engage-
ment and everyday action (the two combined constituting a lifestyle). In a certain 
sense, Næss’s works revived a thought brought to life by Vernadsky some fi ft y years 
earlier in Th e Biosphere: “Th e direction in which the processes of evolution must 
pro ceed, namely towards increasing consciousness and thought, and forms having 
greater and greater infl uence on their surroundings” (quoted in Crutzen 2002: 23).
However, the greater infl uence over our surroundings Næss advocates for is one that, 
as a result, implies a lesser impact on the environment and a greater sustainability of 
human communities among nature. Between 1985 and 1992, French semiotician and 
psychiatrist Félix Guattari also developed the concept of ecosophy (Guattari 2013). 
In his view, ecosophy was to become an empowering framework in opposition to 
the capitalist lifestyle, an integrated paradigm taking into account the three ecologies 
Gregory Bateson had already identifi ed – environmental, social and mental ecologies 
(Bateson 2000[1972]). Both Næss’s Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle and Guattari’s 
original French version of Th e Th ree Ecologies were published in 1989. Now, more than 
25 years later, the ecosophical project is still largely relevant, yet oft en misinterpreted, 
if known at all.
Th e word ‘ecosophy’ combines the Greek ‘oikos’ and ‘sophia’: ‘household’ and 
‘wisdom’. As with ‘ecology’, the meaning of ‘eco-’ (oikos) refers to something larger than 
a mere household understood in a domestic sense. From the ecosophical perspective, 
our oikos is the Earth taken as a whole, as we inhabit it. Th us, an ecosophy is a 
philosophical worldview or a system inspired by our living conditions in the ecosphere. 
Both Næss and Guattari suggest that an ecosophy is more than a mere abstract system 
of thought. Indeed, it calls for a radical change in views and beliefs, challenging 
long established anthropocentric models ruling over the nature/culture dichotomy, 
the notion of dominance and property over other species, and ultimate premises of 
life (Gare 2014). Yet if a shift  in models is to occur, it is to be understood as a mere 
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corollary; it is the ecosophers’ lifestyle and actions, expressing and promoting the 
Deep Ecology principles, which shall be deemed responsible for the change happening. 
Ecosophy promotes self-discipline, determination, and community organization. In 
Næss’s exemplar case, this lifestyle corroborates a fully-fl edged asceticism reminiscent 
of Spinoza (for whom God was equated with the natural world, or nature).
Th e primary objective of this paper is to explore the relationship between ecosophy 
and semiotics. I approach ecosophy and semiotics pragmatically, focusing ultimately 
on praxis and experience, in order to recognize the ways in which living beings are 
aff ected by signs, and how environments (or nature) are altogether perfused with signs – 
a prerequisite to any semiotic worldview (see CP 5.448). Such recognition would 
highlight the ability we have to change these signs-aff ections, and the limits of this 
specifi c capacity.
In what follows, I shall fi rst ascertain the shared premises of ecology and semiotics 
in their cenoscopic forms. I will then contextualize the emergence of ecosophy and 
address the issue of value, as this notion is transverse to ecosophy, axiology and 
semiotics. In exposing Næss’s and Guattari’s variants of ecosophy, emphasis will be 
put on main diff erences and possible points of convergence between them, especially 
those compatible with general semiotics. Discussing the purpose and ambitions of 
ecosophy, an appreciation of the role semiotics could play in this respect will be made. 
In return, the potential impact of ecosophy on semiotics, and more generally in the 
humanities, is to be gauged. Ecosophy, I shall argue, is axiomatized semiotics – its main 
activity is to ever precise (interpret) propositions (or signs) in respect of a basic set of 
axioms. Th is paper goes beyond a mere presentation of the two predominant fi gures 
in ecosophy; several novel ideas are advanced. Rarely has ecosophy been approached 
from a semiotic perspective. Scarce exceptions exist (Tønnessen 2003; Lauer 2005; 
Kull 2011), but fail to develop suitable comparative analysis, neither between Næss 
and Guattari nor between ecosophy and semiotics. Arguably the most comprehensive 
contribution in this perspective to date, this paper is written in the hope of starting a 
thread on a subject in dire need of attention.
Basic premises shared by semiotics and ecology
Semiotics is generally not regarded as a discipline in itself, but rather as an approach 
or a method. It has for long been, and remains in many ways, an intellectual 
tradition, starting from Aristotle and Augustine, and is oft en referred to, following 
the seminal works of Charles S. Peirce, as “the doctrine of signs”. Th anks to Th omas 
A. Sebeok in particular, a paradigm shift  occurred at the turn of the 21st century, 
one that helped bring semiotics to the forefront. As Brooke Williams Deely (2011: 
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371) explains: “Th omas A. Sebeok moved beyond the boundaries of pre-existing 
philosophical paradigms towards what semiotics has become as a new paradigm 
for all the disciplines”. Th is shift  was made possible by emphasizing an important 
epistemological distinction based on Peirce and neatly analysed by John Deely (2009), 
between cenoscopic and ideoscopic sciences. Semiotics, Peirce argues, is primarily of the 
former kind: its purpose is that of “cenoscopic studies (i.e., those studies which do not 
depend upon new special observations)” (CP 8.342). Furthermore, in Peirce’s view, the 
cenoscopic studies of all signs (i.e., of all signs’ action observed through their dynamic 
relations, or semiosis) “remain one undivided science” (CP 8.342). In accordance with 
both Peirce and Sebeok, semiotics can be characterized as a metatheoretical science. 
While it does not produce new scientifi c data, it can suggest new ways of organizing 
the data made available by special sciences (or ideoscopic sciences) and, in doing so, 
it can help connecting specifi c knowledge through a unifying systemic model. Th e 
results obtained by cenoscopic methods may in turn have repercussions on ideoscopic 
sciences – a change in modelling leading to a change in practices.
Now, ecology features many of the aforementioned characteristics defining 
cenoscopic sciences. When Ernst Haeckel heralded it as a new science in 1866, its 
aim was to study the relations of organisms with their habitat (see Haeckel 1866). In 
1877, Karl Möbius coined the term biocoenosis (from “bios”, life, and ‘koinoein’, to 
share something, to have something in common) in order to grasp the scope of biotic 
communities and elicit them as units of interest for research (see Möbius 1877). In 1935, 
Arthur G. Tansley defi ned the concept of ecosystem, which is central to all ecological 
studies nowadays. Ecosystemic modelling is at the root of an important shift  in views by 
which the most important notion for ecology has become the totality of a system and not 
simply a single object (or organism) anymore. In Tansley’s (1935: 299) words: 
[…] the more fundamental conception is, as it seems to me, the whole system (in 
the sense of physics), including not only the organism-complex, but also the whole 
complex of physical factors forming what we call the environment of the biome – 
the habitat factors in the widest sense. Th ough the organisms may claim our 
primary interest, when we are trying to think fundamentally we cannot separate 
them from their special environment, with which they form one physical system.
An ecosystem denotes a continuous and irreducible assemblage comprising a biotic 
community and its environment. Biology traditionally conceives of the environment, 
or more specifi cally the biotope, as nonliving. An ecosystem is thus the reunion, in 
a single analytic unit, of a biocoenosis (a community of living beings: fl ora, fauna, 
fungus) and a biotope (a nonliving habitat: geology, hydrography, topography, climate 
conditions, etc.). Th e value and correctness of this shift  in conception – from the 
study of individuals to the study of ecological wholes – has long been debated and 
continues to nourish many discussions in environmental ethics (see McShane 2014), 
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but it irrefutably allowed for a whole domain of knowledge to bloom along the line of 
this new, holist and relational paradigm. Tansley himself was well aware of the implicit 
hindrances of this conception, mainly that of causation, asking: is the community the 
cause of its own activities? Th e very same question arises when dealing with semiosis, 
or the action of signs engendering other signs. Tansley’s take on this conundrum may 
help us focus on what is at stake: 
In a certain sense […], the community as a whole may be said to be the “cause” 
of its own activities, because it represents the aggregation of components the sum 
(or more properly the synthesis) of whose actions we call the activities of the 
community – actions which would not be what they are unless the components 
were associated in the way in which they are associated. […] But it is important to 
remember that these activities of the community are in analysis nothing but the 
synthesized actions of the components in association. We have simply shift ed our 
point of view and are contemplating a new entity, so that we now, quite properly, 
regard the totality of actions as the activity of a higher unit. (Tansley 1935: 299)
It should be understood, hereaft er, that ecology and semiotics share this structural 
propensity to study units of a higher degree – systems of signs –, which does not 
preclude an interest in objects themselves, but conceives of the object as shaped by its 
relations within a given environment. Also, it must be said that ecology is discussed 
here strictly in its cenoscopic form, i.e., ecology as the science of correction and 
modelling in accordance with an organizational paradigm entailing a set of axioms, 
the infl uence of which pervades through all special or ideoscopic sciences, including 
ideoscopic ecology itself.
Now, if objects are shaped by their relations within a given environment, what, 
then, is a relation? Most reductionist ontologies exclude any entity other than 
individuals, as the Ockham razor suggests is best. To an Ockhamist, a relation is 
nothing but a similar trait or feature shared by two or more individuals according 
to a comparison made by an observer, i.e., a comparison established in someone’s 
mind. Peircean semiotics refuses this reductionist view and elevates signs as a fully 
recognized category of being, which can be mind-dependent or mind-independent 
(depending on the type of sign considered). Th e ontological status of a sign is that of a 
relation. In Deely’s (2009: 177) view, due to this crucial disparity between ontologies, 
the modernist (Ockhamist) conception of relationship is irreconcilable with that of 
Peirce’s and semiotics in general:
A causal relation, for example, in modern thought, is considered as the interaction 
of two or more things. But such interaction is not a relation; a relation is what 
results from and survives as over and above the interaction. A relation is invisible 
to sense, even though it unites the sensed; and it is indiff erent to spatial distance, 
unlike the interaction which gave rise to it. 
516 Simon Levesque
All of this, then, enters into our semiotic notion of sign. A sign as provenating 
a triadic relation is not an object, or at least need not be. On the contrary, the 
action of signs – semiosis – is what every object presupposes.
Objects presuppose semiosis just as organisms presuppose an environment to occur; 
it is an absolute sine qua non condition. An individual cannot be properly accounted 
for if it is taken as an autonomous unit, i.e., separated from its surroundings. Th is idea 
has long been rejected, but results obtained in epigenetics tend to invalidate all claims 
of falseness regarding this axiom (McShane 2014). Again, Deely (2011: 131) makes it 
clear as to how an organism pertains to its environment:
Th e organism is itself a physical part of the physical surroundings. It acts on the 
things around it, and the things around it act upon it. Th ose of these interactions 
which fall within the range of the sense powers become the sensible Umwelt, or 
world objectively sensed by and for that organism. But if the Innenwelt upon 
which the Umwelt as such depends were not already engaged in semiosis, there 
would be no Umwelt – only a physical environment not just independent of mind 
but unknown by any fi nite mind at all! 
Th e important notion to acknowledge here is the profound intertwinement of organisms 
with their supporting milieu, and the fact that the milieu would not exist as such (i.e., as 
apprehended objectively by a given cognitive organism) if it were not for the interpretative 
capacity all living organisms manifest when facing aff orded signs (on the notion of 
umwelt, see Uexküll 1928; Kull 2001a; Deely 2004). Th e environment is not merely 
sensed, but perceived (as objects are formed): there need be perceptual judgements by 
organisms in order for them to avoid danger and favour reproduction. Natural selection 
and adaptation is thus fully intelligible within the biosemiotics framework (Hoff meyer 
2008, 2014). But how can this be linked to any social consideration – undeniably, an 
inevitable issue in environmental ethics? In line with Deely (2011: 133), one must 
concede that “objects as organized within an Umwelt function as signs of another and 
of what is desirable and undesirable and safely ignored within that objective world. We 
may call this transformation of objects into signs their social function”. Susan Petrilli 
(1993: 246) uses the term ‘ethosemiotics’ (based on Morris 1964) to grasp “that kind of 
inquiry into signs which is not purely descriptive, which does not expect to be neutral”, 
describing it as “[a]n approach that reaches beyond the logico-cognitive aspect of the 
semiotic process in its responsiveness to problem of the axiological order, to problems of 
evaluation, of ethics and aesthetics”. Th us she encourages the development of a 
[…] broader view of semiotics, where the study of signifi cance designates the 
disposition towards evaluation, the value that we confer upon something, the 
condition of being signifi cant, the very relevance and value of meaning determined 
by man’s involvement at both the aff ective and pragmatic levels. (Petrilli 1993: 247)
 Arne Næss, Félix Guattari, and their connection with semiotics 517
Stanisław Pietraszko formulates a similar project when he observes (Pietraszko 1997: 
1023–4; my translation, S. L.) that “emotions and aff ections are psychical correlates 
of value, and, most of the time, evaluation is expressed through them. At the same 
time, psychology suggests that values are predominant organizing factors at play 
in cognitive processes”. Drawing on Whitehead 1938, he adds that “evaluation is 
inseparable from experience, which is always evaluative experience”; and so concludes: 
“All man’s world is clearly axiocentred” (Pietraszko 1997: 1024). Broadening the scope 
of analysis from humans to life as a whole, Kull (2001b: 355) believes that “the origin 
of value can be seen as a problem of theoretical biology and biosemiotics”, because “it 
deals with sign processes in living nature”. But what does not? Naturalizing ethics must 
be practised with the greatest of care, and be maintained only insofar as it allows for 
a better understanding of the mechanisms axiological activity displays. Nevertheless, 
it seems right to say that values can only be studied properly as taking place within 
natural order, i.e., from a species-specifi c point of view. Th is means human dominance 
among other creatures and over elements ought to be taken into account.
It is a fact that perceptual judgments are value judgments, and any judgment is 
inherently ecological in the sense that it arises in an experiential mind, i.e., from a 
defi nite umwelt. While the ability we have to interpret signs in the most sophisticated 
ways is certainly an outcome of evolution with respect to survival and fi tness, 
interpretation nevertheless implies by necessity the ascription of a defi nite value to 
every cognized proposition, or else the usually seamless process of object-formation 
would fail irremediably. Peirce (CP 5.267) stresses the fact that “there is no absolutely 
fi rst cognition of any object, but cognition arises by a continuous process”, namely, 
semiosis. Th is presupposes that value ascription cannot be reduced to the arbitrariness 
of one’s judgment.1 Biological, environmental and cultural factors are at play and must 
be taken into account. Semiotics, ecology and axiology are thus closely interrelated, 
and it is precisely this interrelatedness that ecosophy pushes forward.
As established heretofore, cenoscopic ecology and semiotics share basic premises, 
and one can imagine ecosophy would in turn show a good deal of common traits 
with semiotics, and presumably even more so with ecosemiotics (Nöth 1998, 2001; 
Kull 1998; Maran, Kull 2014) and semioethics (Petrilli 2014; Deely 2008). Th is is true, 
indeed. However, here is not the place to argue about it. My aim is not to compare 
ecosophy to these subfi elds of semiotics, but to reveal the analogical relationship 
1 Nor can it be reduced to some transcendental godlike Sign, no matter how unfathomable. 
According to Peirce’s notion of semiosis (or continuity), there is neither any original sign 
nor fi nal sign. Consequently, we are forever (relatively) lost in the semiosic stream (Merrell 
1996: 27–8). Hence this very understandable anthropological tendency, shared by all human 
cultures, to deify such an absolute referential Sign and make it rule over values and behaviours 
(prescribed and proscribed) among mortals.
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that connects ecosophy and semiotics in general. As we shall see, both are inherently 
ecologically designed. While semiotics is generally perceived as focusing on modelling 
(see Anderson, Merrell 1991; Sebeok, Danesi 2000; Kull 2010), ecosophy is primarily 
conceived of as inclined towards ethics and practical action – ‘sophia’, or wisdom, 
suggesting a virtuous behaviour (i.e., in conformity with a defi nite ethic). My objective 
is to invert this perception by stressing the practical side of semiotics and the modelling 
side of ecosophy in order to corroborate their complementarity.
According to John Tinnell (2011: 38), “we might think of ecosophy as performing 
a metamodeling with respect to environmental models such as the ecosystem”. I will 
not argue against this point. However, what I wish to highlight in this paper is: (1) how 
sign systems models and dynamics (developed by semiotics) shape ecosophical praxis, 
and why, therefore, sign systems are as important to ecosophy as are ecosystem models 
developed by ideoscopic ecology; (2) the relevance of the proposed emphasis put both 
on praxis formation and the semiotic dimension of ecosophy in analysing the ways 
in which ecosophy and semiotics can be coordinated while not sublimating their 
respective designs and purposes; (3) the characteristic ethics this semio-ecosophical 
worldview purports, and the working defi nition of ecosophical praxis it entails; 
and (4) logical implications of this worldview and entangled axiology for research 
axiomatization in the humanities and beyond.
Contextualizing the emergence of ecosophy
Næss was a keen mountaineer. He led the fi rst expedition to conquer the 7,708m Tirich 
Mir, in Pakistan, in 1950 (and again in 1964). He oft en expressed that his experience 
of the mountain was a predominant infl uence in shaping his personal ecosophy. It is 
thus closely linked to the fate of Deep Ecology, the movement he pioneered since the 
beginning of the 1970s and continued to promote and develop until his death in 2009. 
As for Guattari, he did not engage openly on this path before the mid-1980s (aft er 
his period of joint writing with Deleuze). He developed his ecosophical branch as a 
result of what he called the “Winter Years”: a decade of political disillusion for him and 
the younger generation in France and throughout Europe (see Guattari 2009). Even 
though one posture follows the other by over a decade, we can say that both Næss’s and 
Guattari’s respective works emerged as outgrowths of the persistent environmental 
movement beginning in the 1960s and calling for ecological responsibility, for they 
both emphasized the poor state of consciousness over environmental issues in the 
Western world as an attempt to bring attention to the situation and change it. 
Nowadays, there is a scientifi c consensus on human-caused global warming 
(Cook et al. 2016). But even before the end of the 1980s, it was clear enough to Næss 
and Guattari that we had entered a time of environmental crisis, resulting from the 
 Arne Næss, Félix Guattari, and their connection with semiotics 519
unbounded expansion of the human habitat. As we know all too well today, the 
situation has continued to worsen over the past 30 years and only recently have we 
coined a term capable of fully expressing the scale of the problem with which we 
are faced: the anthropocene (Crutzen, Stoermer 20002). Ceballos et al. 2015 shows 
humans induced a global loss of biodiversity; Newbold et al. 2016 shows the loss of 
biodiversity worldwide is seriously menacing ecosystems sustainability and, along 
with it, human well-being. Still, this situation is hardly unexpected. As capitalism 
dominates worldwide, it promotes an ideology of infi nite growth, entrenching values 
of exploitation, private property, and accumulation, generally resulting in major 
alterations of ecosystems and their established biocoenosis, ecoregions’ climate 
disorder (see for example Todoc 2006), let alone global warming. 
Mass commodifi cation promoted by dominant economist ideology – singling out 
money as the only homogeneous currency defi ning value judgement and praxis on a 
global scale – was already occurring by the time Næss decided to resign from his position 
at the University of Oslo; it was 1969, he was 57. He left  to devote himself unreservedly 
to an outright ecosophical life and develop his thoughts freely on the matter. Næss raised 
an important distinction between ‘bigness’ and ‘greatness’ and between ‘standards of 
living’ and ‘quality of life’: the former are quantitative while the latter are qualitative. 
Th is distinction is clearly stated in the sixth and seventh points of the Deep Ecology 
platform:3 “6. Decisive improvement requires considerable change: social, economic, 
technological and ideological. 7. An ideological change would essentially entail seeking 
a better quality of life rather than a raised standard of living” (Næss 2002: 108–109).
It may be obvious to a younger generation that previous generations of thinkers 
and activists (partly) foresaw, at least three decades ago, the state of the world as it is 
now. Yet not much has changed since the fi rst calls to take action (most importantly 
maybe that of Carson 1962), neither ideologically nor practically. And, as predicted, 
the situation has only intensifi ed, become more palpably real. Green politics emerged 
to make us believe capitalism and ecology are compatible, and “greenwashing” 
emerged as a marketing tool to raise sales overshadowing a shallow awareness. A single 
newspaper article about the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) growth prediction 
for 2015 may help illustrate the nature of this shallowness. Th e article is reporting the 
point of view of the managing director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, who claims that 
2 Crutzen, Paul J.; Stoermer, Eugene F. 2000. Th e “Anthropocene”. Global Change Newsletter, IGBP 
41: 17–18. http://www.igbp.net/download/18.316f18321323470177580001401/1376383088452/ 
NL41.pdf was accessed on 11 April 2016.
3  Th e eightfold Deep ecology platform was developed by Næss and Sessions in 1984, pub lished 
in Devall and Sessions 1985, and revised in Næss and Haukeland 2002. Næss, Arne; Sessions, 
George 1984. Basic principles of deep ecology. can be retrieved from https://theanarchistlibrary.
org/ library/arne-naess-and-george-sessions-basic-principles-of-deep-ecology.
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while the growth predictions for 2015 are about the same as last year’s (3,4%), it is 
“simply insuffi  cient”. Lagarde continues: “Six months ago, I warned about the risk of 
a new mediocrity, that is to say, a slow growth over a long period of time. Today, we 
can’t allow this new mediocrity to become a new reality” (AFP in Le Devoir, April 10, 
2015; my translation, S. L4.). Arguably, this kind of assertion can be deemed rooted 
in a one-dimensional economical simulacrum, forged and maintained by an elite 
(holding dominant positions in discourse transactions) to increase production and 
lower expenses of exploitation. Money, a medium by defi nition, has become an end to 
itself as growth is fetishized (on fetish signs, see Sebeok 2001: 115–126). According to 
Jahlly (1987: 29, cited in Sebeok 2001: 117), fetishism “consists of seeing the meaning 
of things as an inherent part of their physical existence when in fact that meaning 
is created by their integration into a system of meaning”. Th rough fetishization, 
anthropologist David Graeber (2001: 105) suggests, “Th e object of desire becomes an 
illusory mirror of the desirer’s own manipulated intentions”.
Indubitably, Lagarde’s discourse manifests an ideology, namely that of capital 
growth as inherently good. Tarasti (2004: 24) defi nes ideology as manifest through 
any utterance “postulating one’s own values as if they were ‘natural’”. Th is implies a 
“naturalization” of certain ideas, thereby becoming irrefutable. Th e processes by which 
certain ideas are naturalized within a given society – occurring through repetitive 
utterances of unquestioned assumptions or rigidifying public narratives – could also 
be defi ned as axiomatization, i.e., the establishment of largely accepted, or self-evident, 
propositions, thereby reducing epistemological complexity to a set of basic “truths”, 
or axioms, underpinning a shared worldview. Th ose axioms need not be rational nor 
consistent with one another. As Tarasti (2004: 25) points out: “When an individual 
or group adopts certain values as its own, those values transform into axiologies, 
which constitute more or less compatible collections of values”. Th is is congruent with 
the axiocentred defi nition of experience proposed by Pietraszko. Wąsik (1997: 347) 
uses the term ‘axiosemiotics’ to designate a “system of specifi c regularities occurring 
between values and meaning that condition and co-determine the modes of human 
life and become materialized in the sphere of products and behaviors of people”. A 
set of values is organized within an axiology structuring beliefs, behaviours, politics, 
economics and social organization. Axioms (truth-valued propositions) are the 
analysable, constitutive units of those axiosemiotic lattices.
As the Greek root of the word suggests – ‘axios’ means ‘worthy’ – , axioms are not 
true or false by nature, but function just like signs. Th e value of a sign is its meaning, 
4 AFP = Agence France-Presse 2015. Christine Lagarde veut éviter une “nouvelle médiocrité” 
économique. Le Devoir, April 10. Available at http://www.ledevoir.com/economie/actualites-
economiques/436746/fmi-la-croissance-mondiale-tout-simplement-insuffi  sante-dit-lagarde; 
accessed on 19 October 2015.
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and, at least in Peircean semiotics, the meaning of a sign, or more precisely of a 
proposition, is its reference as seized by some interpretant connecting a representamen 
to its appropriate object (see Stjernfelt 2014 on Dicisigns, i.e., signs susceptible of 
truth-value ascription). A sign can only be appreciated from a defi nite point of view, 
as part of a bigger scheme, and in opposition with other signs; its value is relative, not 
absolute. However, as is well known, the degree of arbitrariness of signs varies, and so 
does the degree of arbitrariness of their value. As a matter of fact, it is the degree of 
arbitrariness of the value that determines the degree of arbitrariness of the sign. Th is 
is a very important point, on which I shall come back in the last section of this paper.
Coming back to our example, growth is valorized in our global economy context 
because it is posited as inherently good (but, interestingly, not necessarily beautiful; 
the value of growth is predominantly ethical, as only some people will fi nd aesthetical 
pleasure in seeking or realizing growth fantasies). It is thus endorsed and vindicated 
(sometimes violently) as such: growth, it is said, makes you wealthier; absence of 
growth is seen as ill and unnatural, and so it makes you poorer. Most fi nancial advisors 
will tell you that if you fail to “make your money work for you”, not only do you miss 
out on the presumed interest to be gained, you basically fail to collect what is given 
to you – a gift  of nature. Th is crooked rhetoric alone is a major incentive to perceive 
growth as good in itself, or as naturally true, since “no growth makes you poorer”, 
and, according to Lagarde, even a slow growth over a long period of time gets you 
“mediocre”. If anything, this shows how easily ethical propositions transmute into 
veridictory stances, pretending to possess epistemic value.
Another way of defi ning naturalization of values, or axiomatization, is to compare 
it to how mythology works. An ideological utterance is usually presented as a type, and 
not so much as a token (Tarasti 2004: 24). Signifi cation of mythological signs cannot 
be deduced from the interpretation of a single occurrence, nor can it be reduced to 
its “message” or content; its reference lies in the recurrence of its form. “One should 
not assume, however, that myths cannot be analyzed. Something lies behind them; 
namely, the axiologies of a community. An ideological statement can be unobvious 
as such, yet still manifest hidden, immanent values” (Tarasti 2004: 25). Capitalism 
ideology, as manifested by discourses (continuous with behaviours: values are abstract, 
but they aff ect organisms which interpret them) expressing variations on a set of defi nite 
axioms, can thus be seen as a contemporary mythology by which world populations 
are being more or less coercively conducted. Here, I adopt E. J. Michael Witzel’s (2012: 
35) defi nition of myth: a myth is “a true narrative that tells of cosmology and society as 
well as of the human condition and that is frequently employed to explain and justify 
social circumstances”. How does our capitalistic mythology aff ect us, then? And what 
constraints and conundrums does it generate? As French physician and philosopher 
Henri Laborit (1973: 8; my translation, S. L.) puts it:
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Th e problem consists in understanding how the myth of growth for the sake 
of growth, and not only to satisfy fundamental needs, has been set up while at 
the same time shadowing to such an extent its initial motivations that it is now 
regarded as the basis of all social behaviour within all industrialized countries, and 
as such is nowadays being defended as an end in itself, as an end for the human 
species, wrapped in aff ective and mystical notions such as happiness, needs, 
progress, the domination of man over cruel nature, when it’s not the domination 
of the white supremacy or that of any other ideological regime in particular. It is all 
defended by perfectly rational discourses, based on a priori, on value judgements 
such as social promotion, always viewed as good in itself, the free market, because 
in a “free” world competition must be free as well, international competition, 
labour as a virtue, while wars provide their daily share of brave heroes, the defence 
of traditions, of currency, and so on.
Næss was well aware of these mythologems and how they are effi  cacious. His 
researches, in the fi rst half of his career, were primarily done in the perspective of 
the philosophy of language. Th e questions of propaganda, rhetoric and persuasion 
are his trade (see Næss 2005, esp. vols. 1–4). In Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle, 
he uses the decay of the German forests as a well-known example, among others, to 
show how being aware of something deleterious is not suffi  cient to trigger change. 
From Næss’s perspective, general inertia is the result of ideologies structuring in a 
profound way, through customs and habits, the greatest number of people, to the 
extent that it constitutes a major disincentive in itself. Th e situation could be abridged 
as follows: Th e lack of desire to trigger change (for one to take responsibility for it, to 
represent that change and encourage others to follow) is immense, but the need to 
defend established rules (for one to seek, or seek gain from, exploitation, extraction, 
liberty of consumption and disposal), even as environmental degradation is occurring 
in the most obvious ways, might just be even greater still. A sense of duty compels 
most people to defend the status quo over change, because change is represented as a 
source of anxiety and possible ruin. As the proverb goes: a bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush. Næss (1989: 87–8) writes: 
Large segments of the European public are now aware of the formidable 
destruction. Th e death of German forests is well known. But the same segments 
have not been able, and partly not even willing, to change the ways of production 
and consumption. Th ese are secured by the inertia of dominant ideas of growth, 
progress, and standards of living. Th ese ideas, manifest as fi rm attitudes and habits, 
are powerful agencies preventing large-scale, long-range changes.
Th is assessment is twofold. First, it deals with the notion of public opinion and 
how people do not feel concerned about environmental issues. Second, it points 
out the underlying reasons why people do not feel empowered about these issues, 
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even though they are well aware of them. To sum up, I cannot help but summon the 
decisive word of the radical American socio-ecologist Murray Bookchin (even though 
Bookchin more than once manifested his disdain for the Deep Ecology movement). 
In Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Bookchin (2004: viii) writes: “Any attempt to solve the 
environmental crisis within a bourgeois framework must be dismissed as chimerical. 
Capitalism is inherently anti-ecological”. Th is has the merit of being clear, and has so 
far proved true. As a matter of fact, both Næss and Guattari expressed exactly the same 
incompatibility. Næss (1989: 24): “It would be unwise to suppose that improvement 
can be achieved for the great majority of mankind without severe political contests 
and profound changes in the economic objectives pursued by the industrial states”; 
Guattari (2013: 64; my translation, S. L.): “It appears the objective is not to merely seize 
power from the bourgeois and the bureaucrats anymore, but to defi ne precisely what it 
is we want instead”. Now, let us see which solutions they championed for a paradigm 
shift  to occur.
Félix Guattari’s ecosophy
As far as it can be established, Guattari and Næss never met. Guattari’s writing on 
ecosophy never even refers to Næss, nor does it explicitly allude to Deep Ecology 
(Genosko 2009: 86). Yet, this does not prevent them from sharing a common 
ground. Guattari would most certainly share Næss’s observation cited above about 
social inertia. Also, he undeniably criticizes capitalism for its role in social inertia, 
as Bookchin does, but he does so, counter to Bookchin, by denying the actuality (the 
actual relevance) of the Marxist framework. In Th e Th ree Ecologies, Guattari (2000: 
47) writes: 
Post-industrial capitalism, which I prefer to describe as Integrated World 
Capitalism (IWC), tends increasingly to decentre its sites of power, moving away 
from structures producing goods and services towards structures producing signs, 
syntax and – in particular, through the control which it exercises over the media, 
advertising, opinion polls, etc. – subjectivity.
What Guattari is suggesting here is that Integrated World Capitalism (IWC), the 
heir to classic capitalism, has changed its focus from exclusively producing goods 
to producing subjectivities through commodities, whether material or immaterial: 
“Integrated Word Capitalism pretends to integrate, program, and conduct every single 
inhabitant of the planet. It seeks to direct even their unconscious fantasies via the mass 
media. A real madness is driving it to promote the homogenization of subjectivity” 
(Guattari 2013: 415, my translation, S. L.). Following this observation, Guattari off ers 
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a typology of the IWC signs, which he sees as the “instruments” underpinning IWC. 
Th e following four types of signs must be understood as parts of an ongoing complex 
process, namely that of capitalist semiosis, which models at once all social constraints 
and freedoms for individuals and communities within IWC:
(1) Economic semiotics (monetary, fi nancial, accounting and decision-making 
mechanisms);
(2) Juridical semiotics (title deeds, legislation and regulations of all kinds);
(3) Techno-scientifi c semiotics (plans, diagrams, programmes, studies, research, 
etc.);
(4) Semiotics of subjectifi cation, of which some coincide with those already 
mentioned, but to which we should add many others, such as those relating 
to architecture, town planning, public facilities, etc. (Guattari 2000: 48)
To clarify the operation of this typology, Guattari (2000: 48) adds: 
We must acknowledge that models which claim to found a causal hierarchy 
between these semiotic regimes are well on their way to completely losing touch 
with reality. For example, it becomes increasingly diffi  cult to maintain that 
economic semiotics and semiotics that work together towards the production 
of material goods occupy an infrastructural position in relation to juridical and 
ideological semiotics, as was postulated by Marxism. At present, IWC is all of 
a piece: productive-economic-subjective. And, to return to the old scholastic 
categories, one might say that it follows at the same time from material, formal, 
effi  cient and fi nal causes.
Th e ecological worldview Guattari tries to build with this semiotic typology is 
one that is able to take into account the broad ensemble of human and nonhuman 
interactions deemed decisive of the human species’ sociality. Th is typology shapes 
restricted patterns of actions that are used as a means of subjectifi cation to an end of 
organization. Th rough this, Guattari attempts to reveal the mechanisms of what he 
calls ‘semiotic machines’: “Sign machines that have their own consistency. But they 
have no reach unless they diagrammatize signs that are in connection with a referent, 
which is a power formation” (Guattari 2013: 338–9; my translation, S. L.). Th ree 
years aft er Th e Th ree Ecologies, in Chaosmosis (1995; 1992 for the original French), 
Guattari proposed a more developed analysis of subjectivity (not intrinsically bound 
to IWC) in terms of four dimensions: (1) material, energetic, and semiotic fl uxes; 
(2) concrete and abstract machinic phyla; (3) virtual universes of value; and (4) fi nite 
existential territories. At this point, we must remember that, for Guattari, ecosophy 
is threefold: environmental, social, and mental. Ecosophy, from his viewpoint, is a 
way to emancipate human relationships both within our own species (between 
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humans and machines alike) and within nature (other species, landscapes, natural 
elements). Emancipation is made possible by taking into account the diff erent modes 
of production and subjectifi cation these relations imply and aff ord. Th us, Guattari 
(2000: 49) formulates the following aspiration for ecosophy:
It is to be hoped that the development of the three types of eco-logical praxis 
outlined here [environmental, social, and mental] will lead to a reframing and a 
recomposition of the goals of the emancipatory struggles. And let us hope that, in 
the context of the new “deal” of the relation between capital and human activity, 
ecologists, feminists, antiracists, etc., will make it an immediate major objective 
to target the modes of production of subjectivity, that is, of knowledge, culture, 
sensibility and sociability that come under an incorporeal value system at the root 
of the new productive assemblages.
Developing a normative semiotic system (defi ning axioms and latitude, codes and 
agency), entails the question of whether this system will allow for dissent and singula-
rization, creating lines of fl ight within its own assemblages, or if it is to be yet another, 
even more resilient, capitalistic signifying and commodifying system of manufactured 
standardized subjectivities. “Rather than looking for a stupefying and infantilizing 
consensus”, Guattari (2000: 50) argues, “it will be a question in the future of cultivating 
a dissensus and the singular production of existence”. New forms of valorization must 
help us quit the homogenesis of capitalistic values that prevent us from emancipation. 
Resingularization should happen through a process Guattari calls “heterogenic”, which 
implies the development of value on a diff erentiated ontological level. In Guattari’s 
view, value is the index of a polarization within a fi eld of desire and power. Th is fi eld 
is a symbolic existential territory, and the value within it is a reference point (Guattari 
2013: 370). Value judgments pertain to an axiological dimension, which is structural 
to any set of relations. So what we should initiate fi rst is not a critical enquiry of the 
values themselves, but an enquiry into the modes of production of those values. Since 
they emanate from our natural and social relationship patterns, those patterns must 
be criticized by means of semiotic analysis.
A fi rst step, Guattari suggests, would be to valorize the reconstitution of human 
relationships by promoting aff ective and pragmatic investment within human groups 
and communities of various sizes. Th is, in turn, would stimulate the desire for 
change and the appropriation of tools, mechanisms, and semiotic devices, promoting 
awareness of sign systems dynamics. Th e new ecological practices Guattari hopes 
for should elicit the ability to capture and activate the heterogeneous, isolated, and 
repressed singularities in order for them to cooperate and build assemblages of 
subjectivities able to function as processes of reterritorialization (to take root, or be 
grounded, in a milieu recognized as such). Simply stated, the aim is to reintegrate and 
inhabit our environment in meaningful ways. To attain it, it is essential to “organize 
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new micropolitical and microsocial practices, new solidarities, a new gentleness, 
together with new aesthetic and new analytic practices regarding the formation of the 
unconscious”, says Guattari (2000: 51). Th is would be the only way whereby politics 
could get back on its feet, “working for humanity and not simply for a permanent 
reequilibration of the capitalist semiotic Universe” (Guattari 2000: 51). Accordingly, 
Guattari emphasizes valorizing politics as an everyday practice as the best, and perhaps 
the only path towards emancipation. Th is might be how genuine ecopolitical praxis 
can be best understood: in the sense of a continuous negotiation of meaning with and 
within our surroundings. It is nothing short of a fully acknowledged semiotic activity. 
Nevertheless, Guattari’s ecosophy remains essentially anthropocentric (i.e., focused on 
politics for the benefi t of human society), whereas Deep Ecology is characterized by 
its nonanthropocentric approach to ecology (see Fox 1990). Næss’s original vision, we 
shall see, is broader and much less speciesist in comparison.
Arne Næss’s ecosophy
In spite of the fundamental diff erence I just evoked, the two versions show obvious 
points of convergence, which I will try to highlight. As for their discrepancies, broadly 
speaking, Guattari elaborates models, discretizes sign-types, and wishes for change 
(even though he partook in some forms of activism himself), whereas Næss explicitly 
puts forward ways of action to embody and initiate that change. It might be true, 
as Tinnell (2011: 37) writes, that “though Næss coined the term ‘ecosophy’, he does 
not think through the semiotic implications of the word as fully as Guattari does”. 
Nevertheless, many aspects of his thoughts on Deep Ecology are inherently semiotic, 
as I shall demonstrate.
Arne Næss’s Deep Ecology platform presents itself as a series of eight general 
assertions working as axioms aiming to condition and coordinate the actions of 
individuals and communities, as well as to structure social organization and economic 
activity. I will not dwell on the content of these axioms, but limit myself to comment 
on their form. (I have shared two of them above, and will share two more below. 
For the full platform, see Næss, Haukeland 2002.) Th e eight axioms are designed 
to serve as a foundation for the development and valorization of a lifestyle able to 
hierarchize the values driving a community. For Næss, semiotic systems are normative 
systems: “Value priorities are socially and economically anchored, and changes in 
these priorities continuously interplay with other changes in a boundless, dynamic 
whole” (Næss 1989: 24). In Næss’s view, the organization and economic structure 
of a given society depends solely on the hierarchy of values within that society, 
so much so that any change in the way a society determines its values produces a 
chain reaction according to a continuing process within a dynamic and unbounded 
globality, which he calls the ecosphere. Th is holistic view shows obvious resemblances 
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with Juri Lotman’s notion of semiosphere (which is derived from Vernadsky’s concept 
of biosphere, see Lotman, M. 2014). Th e semiosphere is the space where semiosis (the 
action of signs) occurs. For Lotman, “the unit of semiosis, the smallest functioning 
mechanism, is not the separate language but the whole semiotic space of the culture 
in question” (Lotman 1990: 125; on the concept of semiosphere, see also Hoff meyer 
2014). Further connections between Næss and Lotman are made below.
To develop his ethic, Næss starts from the premise of an unavoidable and 
irreducible co-dependence of man and nature. Th e more we understand the unity 
we are forming with other living beings (as well as with what most people would 
consider nonliving natural entities, e.g., rocks, landscapes), the more we identify with 
them and make ourselves available to them. Understanding this intrinsic togetherness 
is the key to a greater care (Næss 1989: 175). Our task, Næss suggests, is to realize a 
form of togetherness with nature that would be the most advantageous. However, this 
goal is acceptable only if the benefi t envisioned is understood not at the individual 
level, but at the “bigger Self ” level: transindividual, interspecifi c and ecosystemic. “One 
can, without hypocrisy, desire something which is for the benefi t of other living beings”, 
Næss (1989: 168) posits, “and one normally obtains great, rich satisfaction from it”. 
Th is attitude, or ethical stance, is the key to Self-realization, which, again, is not to be 
understood as a process occurring at the individual level, but at a transpersonal and 
ecosystemic level: I better put eff orts in doing good for whom or what is around me 
than for myself alone, because without my milieu, I am nothing – I simply cannot exist 
as an individual outside of a given environment. Deep Ecology, prior to the movement 
Næss wished it to become in the political space, is fi rst and foremost an ethic, a 
practice of the self, an asceticism that can be shared due to its exemplar character: I can 
desire something for the benefi t of someone else, and someone else can do the same 
for me. Th is attitude is very similar to Peirce’s (1893: 177) Golden Rule in his 1893 
essay, Evolutionary Love: “Sacrifi ce your own perfection to the perfectionment of your 
neighbor”. It should not, however, be understood anthropocentrically, or in a speciesist 
fashion (on speciesism, see Ryder 2012; Horta 2010). Næss stresses how crucial it is to 
acknowledge the universal right to live and blossom, or the biospherical egalitarianism 
principle. Th is view, or wished turn, is oft en called ‘ecocentric’ or ‘biocentric’, which 
are somewhat misleading terms. Fox explains (1990, sine pagina): 
Whereas an anthropocentric orientation considers the nonhuman world as so many 
“resources” to be used as humans see fi t, an ecocentric orientation attempts, within 
obvious kinds of practical limits, to allow all entities (including humans) the freedom 
to unfold in their own ways unhindered by the various forms of human domination.
Similarly, Kull (2001: 356) suggests: “the necessary turn to a biocentric view […] may 
mean that the valuing process is extended so that the experiential world of any living 
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being is included”. Counter to some misleading critiques (among others, Bookchin et 
al. 1993), to abide by the biospherical egalitarianism principle does not involve being 
misanthropic or denying our human uniqueness, or humanness. As Næss (1989: 170) 
explains:
A biology which clearly states the biological peculiarities of human beings, as 
well as the diff erences, e.g. between human and animal communication, is fully 
compatible with an ecosophy of identifi cation and equal rights. A specifi c feature 
of human make-up is that human beings consciously perceive the urge other 
living beings have for self-realisation, and that we must therefore assume a kind of 
responsibility for our conduct towards others.
To adopt and follow a coherent ecological ethic (an ecosophy) represents the only 
way whereby one can incite another to join a common cause, and a community 
supporting that very common cause. Or rather, it is the only way whereby disparate 
people (partaking in an organizational schema that does not relate them functionally) 
can fi nd a reason to coordinate their actions naturally. By emphasizing this very 
relational aspect, Næss follows Spinoza, for whom one can never be truly constrained 
but by one’s own profound belief in a just cause, as apprehended by virtue of its freely 
exercised reason (Spinoza 2007; see also Næss 1977, 1993; Gamlund 2011). Th is is 
precisely why Deep Ecology must be a movement, i.e., driven by exemplarity, infl uence, 
and persuasion, so the greatest number gets acquainted with the ideas it promulgates. 
In Næss’s view, the ecopolitical frontier is immensely long, and so there is an equally 
immense ecopolitical territory that is not yet bounded by this indefi nitely long frontier. 
While the frontier is immense, it is also multidimensional. Each singular action, each 
individual developing or maintaining a stance in regard of, and a relationship with, 
this frontier aff ects others: “the pull of the pole of greenness can be felt in all our 
political positions and actions” (Næss 1989: 162).
Ecosophy is axiomatized semiotics
Let us remember that “the boundary, which surrounds a semiotic system as ‘self ’ and 
distinguishes it from ‘non-self ’, is not, according to Lotman, a mere line or surface, but 
a whole region with a complex and generative behavior” (Kull 1999: 127). Th e frontier 
Næss is evoking is immensely long (unlimited) because of its generative nature, and 
standing for its recognition helps it lengthen. Th e longer the frontier, the broader its 
infl uence becomes, the more traction the movement gets. Th e ecosphere is at once a 
semiosphere, where political ideas are communicated, and an axiological territory, 
where dominance over normative value apparatuses is negotiated. Lotman (1990: 128) 
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explains this quite clearly in Universe of the Mind, where he highlights how dominance 
occurs through normative codes structuring sign systems:
Whether we have in mind language, politics or culture, the mechanism is the same: 
one part of the semiosphere […] in the process of self-description creates its own 
grammar. […] Th en it strives to extend these norms over the whole semiosphere. A 
partial grammar of one cultural dialect becomes the metalanguage of description 
for culture as such.
Codes naturally tend to constrain one another by virtue of what Lotman calls the 
“self-descriptive” tendency. Th e semiosphere is driven by ecological dynamics 
between centre and periphery. Self-descriptive semiotic structures (those prone to 
autocommunication, i.e., critique and correction) arise as the epicentre of a radiant 
dominance exercised by virtue of the adherence it purports.
Semiotic space is characterised by the presence of nuclear structures (frequently 
multiple) and a visibly organised more amorphous semiotic world gravitating 
towards the periphery, in which nuclear structures are immersed. If one of these 
nuclear structures not only holds a dominant position, but also rises to a state of 
self-description, thereby separating itself from the system of meta-languages, with 
the help of which it describes not only itself but also the peripheral space of a given 
semiosphere, then the level of its ideal unity creates a superstructure which itself is 
above the irregularity of a real semiotic map. (Lotman 2005: 213)
Deep Ecology, unaware of Lotman’s theorizing of the semiosphere, acknowledges all the 
same this phenomenon. It manages to open, within the movement’s general proposition, 
a space of valorization for a plurality of descriptive variants of action, namely: ecosophies. 
Th is plurality is programmatic: it serves as the basis to form distinctive communities 
around iterative ecosophical dissensuses, in opposition to the general consensus existing 
over ecology that is naturally shared by all ecosophical communities and ecosophers. 
Deep Ecology has a normative and transformative aim, and this is why it must be 
developed so as to conform to preexisting enunciative logics as much as to propose 
new ones. According to Næss (1989: 74), “our opinions as to what is or ought to be done 
are highly dependent upon our hypotheses as to how the world is organized. Applied 
to ecological relationships, this implies that our norms are dependent upon our beliefs 
regarding the interdependency relations within the biosphere”. Consequently, as far 
as opinions are concerned, the situation within the environment we suppose is ours 
predominates over the actual organization of the species and its social groups in relation 
with nature. Our perception of the ways in which we partake in the dynamic processes of 
ecosophical development determines how we actually partake in it; it shapes the lifestyle 
we choose to adopt (individually and collectively). 
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Th is lifestyle develops in correlation to the depth of understanding we have of the 
interdependencies on which rests the very possibility that is ours to live harmoniously 
as a living community within life as a whole. Hence the importance Næss gives to 
ontology. For him, ethics depends solely on ontology, because ontology shapes the way 
reality is perceived. Th e rule could be stated as such: “a change in hypotheses [about 
what there is] generally leads to a change in norms” (Næss 1992, sine pagina). Posit, 
for instance, that relations exist, and the materialist-reductionist paradigm becomes 
inoperative: the mind/matter nature/culture dichotomy is no longer valid (see Merrell 
1996; Santaella 2001). It is the implicit decrees we translate by ruling over the modes 
of existence of lifeforms surrounding us that mould our collective lifestyle, and such 
a lifestyle necessarily entails a set of rules of action defi ning our relationship with 
these surrounding forms of life. In a nutshell: if our beliefs shape our norms about 
the type of relations we can engage, or maintain, with the lifeforms surrounding us, 
it is because our beliefs over-determine our perception (given important biological 
limitations and cultural limitations related to historical inertia). Acknowledging the 
power of beliefs, the task for the Deep Ecology movement is clear: it needs to bend 
beliefs so that a fresh look can prevail. Adopting an ecosophical worldview should help 
induce new organizational models at the species level (taken as the widest cultural 
system possible), thus instilling a lifestyle that is coherent with the ethical commitment 
Deep Ecology prescribes.
As a corollary, this commitment generates decentred axiosemiotic nucleuses, i.e., 
the ecosophers and ecosophical communities promoting ecological wisdom. Th e 
environment is not to be viewed as a mere habitat anymore; a new relational, total-fi eld 
image is to be valued, whereby related organisms are conceived as “knots in the fi eld of 
intrinsic relations” (Næss 1989: 28). Deep Ecology is, above all, an ethic of relationships 
from the viewpoint of the species, our constituent form of life, among others. Th is 
specifi c ethic prescribes to perceive actively (i.e., render obvious and preponderant) 
the ways in which human communities dynamically partake in signifying processes 
in a space that is all at once an ecosphere, a semiosphere, and a vast political territory. 
Both Næss’s and Guattari’s ecosophies involve, as a fundamental requirement, the 
fi nesse and power of semiotics – the systematic study of meaning-making –, as it 
best connects modelling and praxis. Semiotics, Nadin (1982: 96) suggests, “refl ects 
the tension between the universal (general) and the individual (particular)”, unifying 
levels by means of a “common currency”, to wit: signs. In return, ecosophy helps reveal 
the inherent, but most oft en eff aced, axiological dimension of semiotics, and suff uses 
it with a defi nite orientation: ecological consciousness.
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Communities as transpersonal spaces of persuasion
Many insisted on Peirce’s understanding of semiotics as the logic of vagueness (Nadin 
1988; Tiercelin 1993). In both Næss’s and Guattari’s ecosophies we are confronted with 
a deliberate vagueness. Vagueness is structural, and “precisation” (a term Næss coined 
to express the action of going towards more precision, see Næss 2005, vol. 1) is the 
dynamic principle that allows for internal discrimination. As Fox (1992, sine pagina) 
describes it: “If something is vague and open to many interpretations and precisations, 
it leads to discussion. And that is the most we can hope for any honest philosophy in 
today’s world”. While members of a community should agree on ultimate premises of 
worldviews (implicitly or explicitly), they must value a plurality of means by which 
these worldviews can gain strength and become actively pursued by others. Th erefore, 
each ecosopher should behave following his/her own personal ecosophy (which is 
supposed to be exemplar to others): everyone is invited to create precision within the 
Deep Ecology movement. 
For the Danish Peircean semioticians Torkild Th ellefsen, Bent Sørensen and 
Christian Andersen, “a community is created and maintained through exchange of 
emotional eff ects, signs, which attract and create members of the community and 
in this process consolidate the community” (Th ellefsen et al. 2008: 177). Th e genesis 
and fate of any community is contingent upon a process of attraction. “From an 
ecosophical perspective, intensities precede both ideology and identity” (Tinnell 2011: 
42). Guattari (with Deleuze) used the concept of refrain to describe this process of 
attraction, subjectifi cation, and territorialization enabling the formation of localized 
communities. Refrains emerge “when motifs are detached from the fl ux of components 
[…] acquiring the ability to generate a process of positive self-reference” (Genosko 
2009: 80). A refrain is a territorial assemblage, a sign enabling an active and creative 
space of appropriation and identifi cation; a place one (or many) may call home. As 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 333) describe it in A Th ousand Plateaus:
[…] home does not preexist: it was necessary to draw a circle around that uncertain 
and fragile center, to organize a limited space. Many, very diverse, components 
have a part in this, landmarks and marks of all kinds. […] now the components are 
used for organizing a space, not for the momentary determination of a center. Th e 
forces of chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the interior space protects 
the germinal forces of a task to fulfi ll or a deed to do. Th is involves an activity of 
selection, elimination and extraction, in order to prevent the interior forces of the 
earth from being submerged, to enable them to resist, or even to take something 
from chaos across the fi lter or sieve of the space that has been drawn.
To delineate a space and organize it is characteristically a semiotic activity, because 
doing so implies: (1) discriminating signs, meanings; and (2) criticizing established 
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grammars or codes. If one chooses, or happens, to enforce a specifi c grammar or 
code within its meaning-making space (one’s space of activity), one endorses a set of 
principles eliciting certain signs or propositions as meaningful (positively valued), 
while others are marginalized or discriminated as meaningless (negatively valued). 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 334) continue: “Th e nomos as customary, unwritten law 
is inseparable from a distribution of space, a distribution in space. By that token, it is 
ethos, but the ethos is also the Abode”. Th is is congruent with the main ecosophical 
idea shared in the introduction: from the ecosophical perspective, our oikos (Abode) is 
the Earth, to wit, geosphere + biosphere + semiosphere. Smaller heterogeneous pieces 
of the Earth – synecdochically or mereologically assembled – form localized ecological 
communities, which are territorialized spaces of subjectifi cation, and limited spaces 
of persuasion. Communities are not formed exclusively of interactive human beings; 
all forms of living and nonliving entities must be included in these locally signifying 
spaces. Th e inclusion criterion is for them to be meaningful, i.e., to express value 
within a sign system.5 Th e role of the ecosopher, therefore, is to recognize the ways 
in which marginalized beings (isolated singularities) may become signifi cant (i.e., 
valorized) if viewed as integral components of a whole. Decentralization is the 
key concept here: organisms are knots in a fi eld of intrinsic relations. At the same 
time, territorialization entails some sort of self-expression that is congruent with a 
cognizance of the self as an individual among others, situated within its surroundings 
(or umwelt), and subjectifi ed through environmental identifi cation. Guattari’s 
ecosophy suggests territorialized communities emerge through singing (we could as 
well say signing) refrains, exchanging emotions (pre-linguistic signs), thus enabling 
spaces of communication able to strengthen community members’ engagement and 
manoeuvrability in the milieu, among surrounding forces, aff ects, signs.6
5  Our defi nition of the community precludes any superfl uous replication of reference 
systems, since sign systems developed by biosemiotics encompass at once the biotic and 
the semiotic. Continuous eff orts are made in the fi eld to identify a defi nite threshold for the 
emergence of life activity (physiosemiotics is discussed, but remains purely speculative). Th e 
core idea of biosemiotics is that signs and life are coextensive. What was once distributed 
among at least three diff erent regimes (biotic, animalistic, symbolic) or disruptive domains 
of enquiry (biology, zoology, anthropology) is now attuned in a unifi ed holist model. For a 
synthetic presentation of main hypotheses in biosemiotics, see Stjernfelt 2002. 
6 As Hoff meyer (2014: 14) explains: “Sign processes are neither forces nor things. Th ey are 
process-relations that organize activities. Th e causality of signs thus diff ers from the causality 
of forces. While signs are frequently misunderstood or ignored, forces always exert their power 
with merciless effi  ciency. Th us the concept of semiosis does bring a novel element to the 
scientifi c tool set for, by defi nition, a sign-process requires an interpretative agency”.
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And so, though we begin at the level of so-called individual subjectivity, this is 
only the beginning of the issue because, for Guattari, the question of the individual 
is inextricably linked with trans-individual domains of fl ows, phyla, territories, 
and universes. Existential refrains are laid out by collective machines, which 
are themselves dialogically related to the available modes and technologies of 
production. (Tinnell 2011: 43)
Th ellefsen et al. add an important precision to their defi nition of community as a space 
where emotional exchange occurs, a precision that makes it similar to the concept of 
refrain. Th ey posit the necessity of an emotional core as the fundamental sign driving 
a community, which is quite similar in many senses to a refrain that can be sung 
collectively and spontaneously:
[…] a community is a semeiotic structure in the sense that a community is created, 
maintained, and developed through ongoing exchanges of signs in accordance to 
a certain purpose. Th e exchange of signs takes place between the members of the 
community assembled around a governing and basic idea, which we refer to as a 
fundamental sign: the emotional core of any community. (Th ellefsen et al. 2008: 
177)
Based on this, we can characterize the Deep Ecology platform (axioms) and movement 
as the propositional expression of an emotional core able to induce adherence on 
the basis of an ever-precising engagement in function of each individual’s related 
experience and dispositions. Emotion is an emboldening means for action, since 
the emergence of an emotion implies beforehand a “change in readiness for action” 
(Th ellefsen et al. 2008: 173). Emotion is the symptom of a not yet distinctly perceived 
urge. Th e fundamental sign, under which members of a given community gather, 
suffi  ces to create a vagueness conducive to praxis. Localized ecosophical communities 
operate as transpersonal spaces of persuasion. And, it can be argued, the greater the 
number of communities engaged in this form of praxis formation, raises the general 
awareness about the basic premises of ecosophy.
Communities, just like signs, because of their constant renewal, are inherently 
vague. But at the same time, they are always in a semiotic process of precisation. 
Th erefore, the role of a community is to ever precise its own purpose. Defi ned as a 
practice entangled in an axiomatized model made explicit by the practice itself, 
ecosophy helps us realize just how important it is to consistently redefi ne the purpose 
and pertinence of our activity as living beings assembled in communities.
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Conclusion: potential impact of ecosophy
 in the humanities and beyond
While, on the one hand, Guattari theorizes the production of subjectivity and 
emphasizes the importance of creating singularities and valuing reterritorialization, 
on the other hand, Næss stresses the transpersonal means by which our co-dependent 
relationship with nature becomes intuitive. To adopt an ecosophical worldview is 
nothing but to personally implement a communal stance; it is a discipline of the self, 
an ethic of exemplarity. It entails the very possibility of forming any community, that is, 
to create assemblages of shared meaning, or shared reality, which in turn gives traction 
to valued actions, driving ideas and goals. Th is is quite close to the empowering 
transformations Guattari (2000: 67) envisions in Th e Th ree Ecologies when he writes: 
To bring into being other worlds beyond those of purely abstract information, 
to engender Universes of reference and existential Territories where singularity 
and fi nitude are taken into consideration by the multivalent logic of mental 
ecologies and by the group Eros principle of social ecology; to dare to confront 
the vertiginous Cosmos so as to make it inhabitable; these are the tangled paths of 
the tri-ecological [or ecosophical] vision.
Th e role of the ecosopher, in both Næss’s and Guattari’s visions, is to trigger an urge 
to develop a genuine, coherent, and sustainable pattern of relations with nature and 
our conspecifi cs. Th is is to be done by stimulating the recognition among peers of a 
common wealth to share and preserve (which, by the way, has nothing to do with the 
Commonwealth described in Th omas Hobbes’s Leviathan). As Næss asserts: all living 
beings have intrinsic value, and the diversity and richness of life itself has intrinsic 
value (those are the fi rst and second axioms of the Deep Ecology platform). As evident 
as it is, it must be clearly stated: the richness of life does not exist for the sole benefi t 
of human beings (genuine ecosophy and speciesism are incompatible), and even if 
it allows humans to fl ourish, it does not mean one, or a single community, or even 
a single species should appropriate some resources or a certain locality exclusively, 
because then others will be deprived of benefi tting from it (i.e., of maintaining 
a sustainable relationship with it). Peirce’s blunt remark settles the matter quite 
reasonably: “Th e real”, says Peirce, is “independent of the vagaries of me and you” (CP 
5.311). Respectful interspecifi c communities should prevail.
Now, to conclude, I would like to assess the potential impact of ecosophy on the 
research in the humanities, assuming its underlying axioms were adopted. For the sake 
of the argument, I shall use semiotics as an emblem of the humanities by reason of its 
characteristic transdisciplinarity. As described, ecosophy has its roots in cenoscopic 
ecology; its purpose is to develop an axiology and a consequent, coherent, ethic. 
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Semiotics is a cenoscopic science; it deals not with scientifi c experiment, but with 
epistemological questions, among which we count those related to ontology and ethics, 
logic and critique. Connections are obvious, but there are arguably some discrepancies 
in purpose. While ecosophy explicitly aims to transform practices, the outcome of 
most researches in the humanities (semiotics included) comes down to a correction 
in views, or interpretations – most oft en correcting pre-existing interpretations by 
means of critique. But ecosophy needs a prior, or concurrent, change in views to enact 
change in praxis. And so both share a common objective or need. On that basis, a 
merger seems conceivable. Doing so, however, would necessarily entail a systematic 
axiomatization of research, encouraging ecosophical probity in design, rendering the 
defi nition of purposes, means, and ends of research activity mandatorily compatible 
with the ultimate premises of a shared ecosophical worldview.
One could argue all this is merely a displacement of the bias towards Deep Ecology 
against IWC (or, in any case, the actual state of aff airs). But this would be misleading. 
A thorough examination has been conducted and, aft er much consideration, it seems 
one set of axioms (IWC) promotes an unsustainable lifestyle, while growing scientifi c 
evidence supports the alternate stance (Deep Ecology). Consequently, a new set of 
axioms is to be favoured. Another reason for such a change is that Deep Ecology’s 
axiology and ethic support and promulgate a lifestyle that is best attuned with (eco)
semiotics wisdom. As mentioned earlier, there is a basic rule in general semiotics to 
ascertain the value of a proposition. Th e degree of arbitrariness of signs varies: there 
are conventional signs, and there are natural signs. But of course, any cognized sign 
is an interpreted sign, so, as far as humans are concerned, no sign can be deemed 
entirely “natural”, as opposed to “cultural” (CP.  2.275). Th e diff erence between 
conventional signs (symbols) and natural signs (icons, indices) lies in the faith they 
aff ord the interpretant in determining the truth they convey. Natural signs’ truth value 
aff ordances are of higher trust, because their reference is to be found in observable 
phenomena, while conventional signs reference depends solely on a convergence 
of judgments exchanged and soldered through communication, i.e., within a given 
community (CP 5.311). While ecosophy deals with social issues (i.e., symbolic 
patterns and dynamics), it is supported by ecology and all ideoscopic sciences of life, 
which conduct scientifi c experiments to study natural patterns and dynamics. Th is 
depth cannot be neglected when assessing the relevance of ecosophy as a doctrine able 
to elicit meaningfulness in social life, organization and economy. But can it pervade 
through all communities, including intellectual communities within the humanities, 
and be adopted as a default stance, thus reforming research activity?
Tinnell (2011: 38) suggests something akin to this idea when he writes: “[...] the 
proper aim of ecosophy (and a properly transversal eco-humanities) is not to produce 
a more energy-effi  cient light bulb or a hybrid car, but to reconfi gure subjectivity and 
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to remake academic and/or social practices altogether”. I do not agree with him about 
what he states to be “the proper aim” of ecosophy; I think his view is reductive and 
academe-centred. Why should ecosophy be prohibited from driving major changes 
in engineering and technology, as long as these changes are done in respect of the 
principles and values ecosophy bears? Th ere is nothing counterintuitive in suggesting 
ecosophy could have a role to play in the industrial world, since it is directly connected 
to the capitalistic modes of production, consumption, and its inherent processes of 
subjectifi cation. In fact, in order to enact urgently required change, and not merely 
wish for it to happen by some magical means, ecosophy must interfere as much as 
possible with the industry. Here, an important divergence between the Deep Ecology 
movement and Guattari’s more politicized disciples emerges: the range envisioned 
for change to happen. Deep Ecology suggests it should only take place in the long-
range – no precise time frame is specifi ed in order to redesign “our whole systems 
based on values and methods that truly preserve the ecological and cultural diversity 
of natural systems” (Drengson 2012, sine pagina7) –, whereas others might think time 
is actually running out. Paradoxically, Deep Ecology extols activism and continues 
to drive community organizing, whereas the heritage of Guattari’s tri-ecology is 
essentially of intellectual nature. As for Tinnell, he might be right as far as academia 
and research are concerned, but restraining the scope and aim of ecosophy to make it 
fi t to a scholarly lifestyle would contravene the basic premises of Næss’s view, which 
states that Deep Ecology should be developed as a movement driving communities. 
And by that he meant any variety of communities, not just scholarly ones.
What I tried to underline in this paper is not only how ecosophy can axiomatize 
research in the humanities and beyond, but also which connections ecosophy and 
semiotics manifest, and how both are complementary. Th is axiomatization would not 
be possible if one of the components were missing in the equation: ecosophy needs 
semiotics to model ecological and social interactions and relationships with respect to 
the principles it promulgates, and semiotics needs ecosophy to instil a defi nite ethical 
dimension in its modelling patterns. In the end, ecosophy helps us understand why 
semiotics cannot be reduced to modelling, for models and praxis are coextensive. 
Nadin (1982: 96) summarizes this quite well:
Th e semiotic fi eld is only part of the generic human fi eld in which transformations 
from one type of praxis to others continuously take place. Th e interaction 
of signs is nothing other than the expression of the interaction of people. Th e 
interdisciplinarity of semiotics should be understood as a condition of existence – 
sign processes imply the (ideal) integrality of human function – and not as a 
theoretical desideratum.
7 Drengson, Alan 2012. Some thought on the Deep Ecology movement. Foundation for Deep 
Ecology. Available at http://www.deepecology.org/deepecology.htm and accessed on 29 April 2016.
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Signifi cation connects the general with the singular, for meaning-making is rooted in 
experience. Ecosophical communities function in the same way, assembling singu-
larities within a purposeful whole. In emphasizing purposefulness and the communal 
dimension of meaning-making and axiomatization processes among human societies, 
ecosophy challenges semiotics to delineate its praxis, forcing it to recognize its, as yet, 
mostly implicit axiological dimension.8
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Две версии экософии: Арне Нэсс, Феликс Гваттари и 
их связь с семиотикой
В статье применяется сравнительный подход, чтобы оценить различные вклады Арне 
Нэсса и Феликса Гваттари в экософию, а также их связи с семиотикой. Предлагаемoe 
экософией целостное мировоззрение и его динамика имеет многочисленные связи 
с семиотикой. Главная цель этой статьи изучение природы и ценности этих связей. 
Исторически развитие экософии всегда сталкивалось с темами моделирования и 
коммуникации, которые обнаруживают очевидную общую основу с семиотикой. Как 
средство для достижения цели экософия развивалa значимую аксиологию на основе 
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экологической мудрости. Семиотика также имеет дело с ценностями: значениями 
и ценностью знаков. В этом отношении семиотика аксиологична по существу, но 
чаще всего это измерение скрыто или приглушено. Подчеркивание аксиологического 
измерения семиотики помогает понять, как устанавливаются доминирующие значения, 
привычки и ценности и показывает возможную ключевую роль, которую семиотика, 
соединяясь с экософией, могла бы играть в гуманитарных науках и шире. Признавая 
комплементарность обеих традиций, автор дает оценку достижимости их слияния. 
Можно утверждать, что эко софия является аксиоматизированной семиотикой. 
С этой новой точки зрения можно человеческие сообщества считать динамично 
принимающими участие в процессах означивания в пространстве, которое является 
одновременно экосферой, семиосферой и обширной политической территорией. Так 
как находится все больше доказательств того, что экологическая деградация ухудшает 
качество нашей жизни и устойчивость наших сообществ, экософия могла бы помочь в 
переформировании ценностей и практик.
Ökosoofi a kaks versiooni: Arne Næss, Félix Guattari ja 
nende seos semiootikaga
Artiklis kasutatakse võrdlevat lähenemist, et käsitleda Arne Næssi ja Félix Guattari selgesti 
eris tuvaid panuseid ökosoofi asse ning nende vastavaid seoseid semiootikaga. Ökosoofi a 
poolt väljapakutaval aluseksoleval holistilisel maailmavaatel ja dünaamikal on arvukaid 
seoseid semiootikaga. Käesoleva artikli peamine eesmärk on uurida nende seoste olemust ja 
väärtust. Ajalooliselt on ökosoofi a väljakujunemine alati kokku puutunud modelleerimise ja 
kommunikatsiooni teemadega, mis moodustavad ilmse ühisosa, mida see jagab semiootikaga. 
Eesmärgi saavutamiseks mõeldud vahendina võttis ökosoofi a ette ökoloogilisel tarkusel 
põhineva mõtterikka aksioloogia väljaarendamise ning selle alt üles propageerimise. Poliitilist 
aktivismi silmas pidamata tegeleb ka semiootika väärtusega: märkide väärtuse ja tähendusega. 
Selles mõttes on semiootika olemuslikult aksioloogiline, kuid enamasti jääb see mõõde varja-
tuks või vaigistatuks. Semiootika aksioloogilise mõõtme rõhutamine aitab mõista, kuidas 
kehtestatakse dominantseid signifi katsioone, harjumusi ja väärtusi, ning valgustada olulist 
rolli, mida see ökosoofi aga ühte sulandudes võiks mängida nii humanitaarteadustes kui ka 
väljaspool neid. Tunnustades mõlema traditsiooni komplementaarsust, antakse hinnang nende 
liitumise usutavusele. Võib väita, et ökosoofi a näol on tegu aksiomatiseeritud semiootikaga. 
Sellest uudsest perspektiivist lähtudes võib pidada inimkogukondi dünaamiliselt osalevateks 
signifi katsiooniprotsessides ruumis, mis on ühtaegu ökosfäär, semiosfäär ning tohutu poliiti-
line territoorium. Et on üha rohkem tõendeid selle kohta, et keskkonna halvenemine kahandab 
meie elukvaliteeti ning meie kogukondade jätkusuutlikkust, võib ökosoofi ast olla abi väärtuste 
ning praktikate ümberkujundamisel. 
